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Medical Research Regulation After More Than
Twenty-Five Years: Old Problems, New
Challenges, and Regulatory Imbalance
Richard S. Saver*
Over twenty-five years ago, medical research
entered a new regulatory era, resulting in more
extensive oversight applied to a wider range of
clinical trials. Protection of human subjects was,
and continues to be, the primary justification for this
regulatory shift. But whether the mission has been
even partially accomplished remains an open
question. While some contend that the existing
regulatory framework inadequately protects research
subjects, others worry about the considerable costs
of compliance. Today's radically different research environment
compounds and exacerbates these tensions. The research oversight system
struggles with persistent old problems while addressing difficult new
challenges, and balancing paradoxical concerns about under regulation and
overregulation. This is a pivotal time.
I. THE 1981 FEDERAL RESEARCH REGULATIONS
In 1981, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) substantially revised their research
regulations, implementing various provisions of the National Research Act
of 19741 and recommendations of the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
Among the major changes, the 1981 rules applied regulatory oversight to
more clinical trials, specified what information should be disclosed to
subjects, and provided detailed criteria concerning the standards for
approving protocols. The 1981 rules also generally expanded the role of
institutional review boards (IRBs), the research review committees that
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1. The National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348 (1974).
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approve and monitor clinical trials involving human subjects. This two-
tiered approach so central to the 1981 regulations detailed informed
consent requirements plus IRB risk/benefit assessment and monitoring -
has remained mostly unchanged and forms the basic framework for the
current federal regulatory scheme.
II. A CHANGING RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
Meanwhile, a very different research environment has emerged since the
promulgation of the 1981 HHS/FDA rules. First, the volume of clinical
trial activity continues to increase at an astonishingly rapid pace, while
research protocols have become more specialized and complex. As such,
IRBs face daunting resource and capacity constraints to monitor research
activity and accurately assess the probable risks. Second, money now plays
a much bigger role in shaping the direction of medical research, with
investigators, medical centers, and industry entering into complex financial
arrangements to commercialize medical discoveries-creating potentially
significant financial conflicts of interest. Third, research activity has moved
away from academic medical centers to community physicians practicing in
diffuse office settings, affecting both who conducts medical research and
where it occurs.
III. PERSISTENT OLD PROBLEMS
While the record is subject to differing interpretation, the new regulatory
framework has likely improved clinical trial safety, as all stakeholders
involved in medical research have become accustomed to the system of IRB
review, adverse event reporting, and other safeguards.For example, a 2004
review of cancer drugs tested during Phase 1 clinical trials, considered the
most dangerous phase of testing, concluded that, over a twelve year period,
the odds of death from an experimental intervention dropped to less than
ten percent of the earlier likelihood.2
Nonetheless, persistent problems remain. With regard to harm
protection, while the likelihood of serious physical injury to subjects
seemingly has been reduced, experimentation, by its very nature, presents
unpredictable risks. The tragic death of Jesse Gelsinger during a gene
therapy investigation at the University of Pennsylvania, a widely reported
incident that brought new scrutiny to the research enterprise, demonstrates
how things can, and still do, go horribly awry in clinical trials. Also, apart
from physical injury, there is increasing recognition of the intangible harms
research subjects endure such as affronts to dignity, breaches of
2. Thomas G. Roberts et al., Trends in the Risks and Benefits to Patients With Cancer
Participating in Phase I Clinical Trials, 292 JAMA 2130 (2004).
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confidentiality, erosion of trust, financial loss, and frustrated access to care.
Boundary issues also continue to present problems. The distinctions
between regular clinical services, true experimentation, and innovative care
presumably falling somewhere in between, have, if anything become all the
more confusing and blurred in the past twenty-five years. As an example,
considerable litigation has been devoted to whether certain cutting-edge
cancer care should be classified as experimental and, accordingly, whether
and when health plans must pay for it. Meanwhile, clinical variation
studies demonstrate wide differences in physicians' treatment selections,
revealing the degree of experimentation and guess-work undertaken by
physicians providing "regular" medical services. Unfortunately, the law
has not helped in addressing the boundary confusion. Court opinions and
statutory/regulatory directives have not clearly and consistently explained
the different obligations arising under the doctor-patient relationship
compared to the investigator-subject relationship.
These boundary confusion issues fuel ongoing informed consent
concerns as well. Despite the research regulations' detailed information
disclosure requirements, therapeutic misconception problems persist. Many
patients still confuse experimentation with regular clinical care. Subjects
also may be unaware that they can sometimes obtain the same services
outside a clinical trial, such as with off-label use of an already approved
drug. Unfortunately, the current oversight system frequently disappoints as
a means of improving the quality of research consent. The typical consent
forms found in research protocols are quite lengthy, full of boilerplate
language, and difficult to comprehend, even after extensive editing by
IRBs. Meanwhile, the regulatory fixation with subjecting written consent
forms to repeated rounds of IRB review diverts energy and resources from
more meaningful methods of monitoring informed consent, such as
audiovisual material, patient ombudsmen, audits, and follow-up interviews
with already enrolled subjects.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES
While such old problems stubbornly persist, the research system faces
significant new challenges as well, including serious risk of both under
regulation and overregulation. Legitimate concerns have been raised about
IRBs' increasing workloads, limited resources, insufficient expertise, and
lack of independence, suggesting that the IRB review system is simply too
weak and ineffective to protect subjects. Yet, the oversight system has, at
times, also appeared overly inclusive. Rather than substantive monitoring
of what happens to subjects on a protocol, enforcement of bureaucratic and
often obtuse procedures characterize much of an IRB's regulatory duties.
The intense commitment of time and resources required to navigate all the
3
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paperwork and secure IRB approval causes considerable frustration among
research system stakeholders, including IRB members themselves.
Instances of regulatory overkill deter beneficial experimentation and
increase the costs of bringing new medical discovers into clinical practice.
The pervasiveness of financial conflicts also presents a significant
challenge. According to recent studies, not only the investigators, but many
of the reviewers sitting on IRBs and conflict of interest committees, have
close financial ties to industry-calling into question the independence and
integrity of the oversight system more generally. One of the preferred
regulatory responses has been more compelled disclosure of such financial
ties to research subjects. But so far this has not been a neat solution.
Effectively conveying financial conflict information has proven quite
difficult. Moreover, subject preference studies call into question how
important subjects consider such information in deciding whether to
participate in a research protocol, suggesting a primarily information-
disclosure approach may be incomplete.
Further difficulties arise from reconsideration of why research subjects
participate in clinical trials and what they really want. The traditional views
regard subjects as altruistic, vulnerable volunteers who deserve special
protection. But this view has proven too simplistic. Subjects participate in
medical research not only to benefit medical progress but for numerous
other reasons, including viewing clinical trials as a last resort when
conventional treatments fail and wanting to be active in the face of serious
disease. Thus, maximizing subject welfare has become a much more
complicated question. As evidenced by the recent Abigail Alliance3
litigation, certain patients want, above all else, access to investigational
technology, and regard regulatory protections as paternalistic interference
with their medical treatment choices.
Other traditional assumptions behind the regulatory model have been
called into question as well, such as the dual loyalty problem. A long-
standing concern has been that physician-investigators will feel pressures to
sacrifice doing what is best therapeutically for the individual patient in
order to advance their research goals. However, the dual loyalty problem is
likely more complex in its actual effects. Recent studies suggest that
certain physician-investigators are often more powerfully motivated by their
clinical, not research, commitments. Thus, investigators have allowed
patients to enroll in studies despite not meeting the eligibility criteria, or
have deviated from the study protocol in terms of medication dosage
amounts given to the subjects, all because they thought individual patients
might benefit. Moreover, opportunistic research subjects have been known
3. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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to "cheat" (not reporting symptoms, sharing medication, etc.) by
disregarding a protocol's procedures in order to maximize their individual
treatment opportunities.4  Unfortunately, such actions undermine the
research's generalizability and validity. Apart from protecting research
subjects, additional regulatory attention is needed to protect the integrity of
the research itself.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, the research oversight system now
faces a possible trust crisis. Opinion polls suggest the public's confidence
in the research system has been eroding, a trend, no doubt fueled by intense
media coverage of subject deaths at leading academic medical centers,
regardless of how anomalous such episodes may be. Industry efforts to
suppress negative trial results, as occurred in the recent Vioxx and Paxil
drug trial scandals, have also contributed to trust erosion. A research
enterprise that cannot depend on the trust and willing participation of
individuals to serve as research subjects simply has no viable future.
V. WHAT LIES AHEAD
With nagging old problems and serious new challenges, the oversight
system faces an uncertain future. Is it completely dysfunctional and
irrevocably broken, as some critics complain? Not likely. It is easy to
gloss over the system's achievements as the regulatory framework's vague
standards, such as ensuring subjects' ethical treatment and protecting them
from harm, defy rule-like precision and make it difficult to evaluate
performance through consistent benchmarks. Even more important, it is not
clear whether better regulatory alternatives exist, and the history of medical
research abuses cautions against a return to largely professional self-
regulation. What does seem critical is that, moving forward, health law
strives to develop smart regulatory responses that demonstrate flexibility,
attention to the actual experiences of research subjects, and awareness of
real compliance costs. Much important work remains to be done and these
are interesting times indeed for thinking about the past quarter-century, and
likely future direction, of medical research regulation.
4. Charles W. Lidz, et al., Competing Commitments in Clinical Trials, 31 IRB: ETHICS
AND HUM. RES. 1 (2009); Udo Schuklenk et al., Terminal Illness and Access to Phase 1
ExperimentalAgents, Surgeries, and Devices, 89 BRIT. MED. BULL. 7 (2009).
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